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ABSTRACT 
 
Evidence suggests that arbitragers exchange investment ideas. We analyze why and 
under what circumstances sharing occurs. Our model suggests that sharing ideas will 
lead to the following: more efficient asset prices, larger arbitrager profits, and correlated 
arbitrager returns. We predict that arbitragers will exchange ideas in markets where 
arbitragers are capital constrained, noise trader influence is high, and arbitrage investors 
are more loss averse. We also predict that arbitrage networks can lead to crowded 
trades, which can create systematic risk in extreme market circumstances. 
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 There are many indications that money managers freely share their ideas with 
other investment professionals and their personal networks. The mediums through 
which investment professionals share ideas are meeting venues, internet communities, 
and personal networks. Some examples of meeting venues set up expressly to allow 
arbitragers to share ideas are the Value Investing Congress, a venue established by 
Whitney Tilson, who in his own words describes the event as an opportunity to “allow 
top investors to meet and learn from each other and get great, actionable ideas,1” and 
the Hedge Fund Activism and Shareholder Value Summit, which allows activist hedge 
fund managers the opportunity to share tactics and discuss ongoing investment ideas in 
a closed forum. The sharing phenomenon is not limited to fundamentals based investors: 
investment banks and large quantitative hedge funds frequently invite other 
quantitative managers and academic economists to discuss new trading ideas and 
technologies (e.g. Lehman’s Finance in Practice Conference). 
Exclusive internet-based information exchanges have blossomed on the internet. 
For example, Sumzero.com is an invite-only internet community open to hedge fund 
managers. The site is specifically designed so professional investors can share investment 
ideas. Perhaps the most famous sharing venue utilized by professional investors is 
Valueinvestorsclub.com, a private community founded by Joel Greenblatt and John 
Petry, managers of the successful hedge fund Gotham Capital. Its founders proclaim 
Valueinvestorsclub.com to be an “exclusive online investment club where top investors 
share their best ideas.”2 The site has been heralded in many business publications as a 
top-notch resource for anyone who can attain membership (Financial Times, Barrons, 
Business Week, Forbes, and so forth). The investment ideas submitted on the club’s site 
are broad, but are best described as fundamental value plays.  
 The membership of Valueinvestorsclub.com is highly confidential both with 
respect to the public and within the club itself (members all post under screen names 
unrelated to who they are). However, the authors have analyzed all 
Valueinvestorsclub.com idea submissions since the club’s founding (January 1, 2000) 
and have reconciled the information in the recommendations with contemporaneously 
                                                 
1 Found on the Value Investing Congress website: http://www.valueinvestingcongress.com. 
2 http://www.valueinvestorsclub.com/Value2/Guests/Info.aspx 
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filed 13-Ds, 13-Gs, and public statements to conclude that the membership of 
Valueinvestorsclub.com primarily consists of value hedge fund managers, activist 
investors, and their associates. In addition, we have spoken to multiple people in the 
hedge fund industry to verify that Valueinvestorsclub.com membership is exclusive and 
coveted by those in the industry. 
 Personal networks are another venue for sharing ideas. Shiller and Pound (1989) 
conclude that direct interpersonal communications between investors are very important 
in investment decisions. Indirect evidence for information sharing is documented by 
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), who document that US fund managers living in the 
same city make similar portfolio choices, Feng and Seasholes (2004), who find similar 
behavior in the Chinese stock market for geographically close investors, and Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy (2007), who find that mutual fund managers who went to college 
together have correlated portfolios.  
We find further evidence that personal networks are important in the investment 
decision. We interviewed multiple hedge fund managers (all funds were focused value 
funds with assets under management ranging from $5mm to $2b3) and came to the 
conclusion, at least anecdotally, that idea exchange is rampant. One manager’s 
comments summarized the general sentiment: “many of our best ideas come from our 
monthly conference calls with other value managers.” We also spoke with employees at 
the largest hedge fund asset allocation consultant in the world4. Their firm listens to 
many of the top hedge fund managers in the world. During meetings they typically ask 
the fund manager for an overview of one of their best ideas. According to the firm’s 
employees, value focused hedge fund managers (many of whom know each other) often 
mention the same handful of ideas. This anecdotal evidence suggests that managers are 
sharing information. 
 Why are arbitragers telling other arbitragers about their investment 
opportunities? According to efficient market logic (Fama (1970)), the rational arbitrager 
should act alone, drive the price to the fundamental level, and reap all the rewards of 
the arbitrage he has found. Unfortunately, arbitragers cannot do this in the real world. 
                                                 
3 The interviews were conducted with the understanding that they would remain anonymous. 
4 The interviews were conducted with the understanding that they would remain anonymous. 
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Two primary reasons for this are capital constraints and the limits to arbitrage arising 
from the realities in the investment management business (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). 
Stein (2007) also questions why one would tell another honestly about an attractive 
trading opportunity when money managers care about relative performance. Stein’s 
question is valid, however, we argue that a lack of transparency and understanding of 
what “relative performance” actually means, causes investors to focus simply on past 
returns (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). 
Dow and Gorton’s (1994) analysis of arbitrager behavior suggests that arbitragers 
will only make investments if they believe subsequent arbitragers will buy the asset and 
push the value to fundamental value. One way arbitragers can help ensure other 
arbitragers take a position in an asset is by sharing their ideas with others. While this 
may be a credible motive for information exchange, we believe there are more important 
influences at work. 
We analyze information exchange amongst arbitragers using the Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) performance based arbitrage framework with an augmentation that 
allows for greater investor loss aversion. In our context, loss aversion means that 
arbitrage fund investors will withdraw large amounts of funds following poor 
performance because they are afraid of further declines. Using this model, we show that 
sharing investment ideas can make sense for arbitragers because it allows them to 
diversify their portfolios amongst a group of arbitrage trades, which will lower the 
probability they experience a large negative shock and have their funds withdrawn by 
loss averse investors. Our model predicts that arbitragers will exchange information in 
markets where noise trader influence is high and in settings where arbitrage investors 
are more loss averse. We also find that sharing ideas can lead to more efficient asset 
prices, larger arbitrager profits, and correlated arbitrager portfolios.  
Sharing amongst arbitragers can also help explain the phenomenon of “crowded” 
trades (reference to a situation where many money managers play an identical trade at 
the same time). For example, a very well received idea posted on 
Valueinvestorsclub.com in September 2008 was the Porsche/Volkswagen negative stub 
trade (a full discussion and analysis of negative stub trades are described in Mitchell, 
Pulvino, and Stafford (2002)). In late October the Porsche/Volkswagen trade went 
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terribly wrong and affected multiple hedge funds (Jameson and Robertson (2008)).  
There is also evidence that quantitative funds crowd into trades. In August 2007, 
an unprecedented number of high-profile quantitative long/short equity hedge funds 
experienced unprecedented losses, which is thought to have been caused by one or more 
sizable hedge funds liquidating (Khandani and Lo (2007)). Khandani and Lo further 
show evidence that hedge fund returns are becoming more correlated over time. Recent 
evidence corroborates this result. A recent bout of hedge fund liquidations is wrecking 
havoc on the hedge fund industry, with the Hedge Fund Research Equity Hedge Index 
dropping 8.59% in September 20085. Ken Griffin (Citadel Investment Group founder) 
speaks for the entire hedge fund industry in his September report to investors, 
“September was a devastating month for financial institutions and investors around the 
world–September was also the single worst month, by far, in the history of Citadel” 
(McSherry (2008)).  
It is important to point out that we do not believe that all crowded trades and 
the recent chaos in the hedge fund markets are a result of direct information exchange 
between hedge fund managers. Another possibility is that arbitragers stumble across the 
same ideas because they are searching for investment ideas based on similar criteria 
(indirectly sharing). Regardless, our model predicts many of these outcomes: when 
arbitragers share ideas, their portfolios will become correlated, and correlated portfolios 
will suffer together when their underlying assets (and asset holders) falter.  
  
I. The Performance Based Arbitrage Model 
The way we model the asset markets closely follows the framework used in Shleifer 
and Vishny (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997). In these models the three market 
participants are noise traders (Delong et al., 1990), investors in arbitrage funds, and 
arbitragers. Noise traders participate in all markets, arbitrage funds focus on certain 
segments, and fund investors spread their money across many arbitrage funds. Finally, 
market participants are risk neutral and the market interest rate is 0. 
At t=1 the fundamental value of assets, V, become known to arbitragers, but not 
their investors. Noise traders, who trade erratically and without regard for fundamental 
                                                 
5 http:/www.hedgefundresearch.com/hfrx_reg/index.php 
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values, have a 1 െ ߮ probability of depressing the asset by ܵଶ and a ߮ probability of 
assessing the value correctly (for simplicity we only examine bearish noise traders). 
More formally, the price at period 2 is defined as 
Pଶ ൌ ൜
ܸ,   ݌ሺܵଶ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ ߮
ܸ െ ܵଶ, ݌ሺܵଶ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ 1 െ ߮
ݏ. ݐ. 0 ൏ ߮ ൏ 1. (1) 
The efficient market price at t=1 is ଵܲ ൌ ܧሺ ଶܲሻ ൌ ߮ሺܸሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻሺܸ െ ܵଶሻ. During t=1, 
noise traders drive down the price of an asset from the efficient market price by ଵܵ. The 
aggregate noise trader demand becomes 
ܳ ଵܰ ൌ ሾܧሺ ଶܲሻ െ ଵܵሿ/ ଵܲ. (2) 
Each arbitrager has funds under management of ܨଵ, which is exogenously determined.  
 At t=1 arbitragers decide to allocate ܦଵ to their own idea and allocate ܨଵ െ ܦଵ 
into cash. In this case, the arbitragers demand for a particular asset will be 
ܳܣܴܤଵ ൌ
஽భ
௉భ
. (3) 
Aggregate demand must equal the unit supply of an asset (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), 
thus the price of an asset at t=1 is  
ଵܲ ൌ ܧሺ ଶܲሻ െ ଵܵ ൅ ܦଵ. (4) 
Like Shleifer and Vishny, we assume ܦଵ ൏ ଵܵ so arbitragers do not have enough 
resources to bring the period 1 price to fundamental value. 
Shleifer and Vishny next develop a model for arbitrager funds based on a 
marketplace where arbitrage fund investors base their investment decisions on past 
performance. The authors determine an arbitrager’s supply of funds at t=2, ܨଶ, as a 
function (denoted by G below) of the arbitragers past returns, where ܦଵ is the amount 
of funds the arbitrager invests at t=1:  
ܨଶ ൌ ܨଵ ቂܩ ቄቀ
஽భ
ிభ
ቁ ቀ௉మ
௉భ
ቁ ൅ ிభି஽భ
ிభ
ቅቃ ݓ݅ݐ݄ ܩሺ1ሻ ൌ 1, ܩᇱ ൒ 1, ܽ݊݀ ܩᇱᇱ ൑ 0. (5)
For simplicity, and because their results do not rely on the concavity of the G function, 
Shleifer and Vishny focus on a linear G, given by  
ܩሺݖሻ ൌ ܽݖ ൅ 1 െ ܽ, ݓ݅ݐ݄ ܽ ൒ 1, (6)
where z is the arbitrager’s gross return. Equation (5) becomes: 
ܨଶ ൌ ܽ ൜ሺܦଵሻ ൬
ଶܲ
ଵܲ
൰ ൅ ሺܨଵ െ ܦଵሻൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ (7)
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In Shleifer and Vishny’s three period model an arbitrager initially has the 
opportunity to invest at t=1. At t=2, noise traders have either further depressed the 
stock price or the stock is at fair value. If noise traders have further depressed the 
asset’s price, the arbitrager invests all they can at t=2, because at t=3 they know with 
certainty they will receive the fair value of the asset.  
Using this basic framework, the authors find that arbitragers may rationally choose 
to not fully invest in an arbitrage opportunity at t=1 (ܦଵ ൏ ܨଵ), even though they know 
with certainty at t=3 they will profit, because at t=2 noise traders may make the value 
of their portfolio lose money. Because the arbitrager is assumed to not have the ability 
to signal to his investors that his poor performance is due to bad luck and not lack of 
skill, the arbitrager’s outside investors will pull their money from the arbitrager at the 
exact time that expected returns are the highest. The end result is that arbitragers are 
sometimes limited in their ability to take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity and 
thus cannot drive security prices to their fundamental prices as the efficient market 
hypothesis would suggest (Fama (1970)). 
We address other economic questions with an adaption of the Shleifer and Vishny 
model that includes strong loss aversion: How does the propensity to withdraw funds 
after poor performance affect asset markets? And, how can arbitragers sharing schemes 
restrain the costs created by noise traders and performance based arbitrage fund 
investors? 
 
II. Loss Aversion in the Hedge Fund Industry 
A. Motivation 
We describe loss aversion in the asset management context as a strong relationship 
between fund flows and negative fund performance, or in simpler terms, if a hedge fund 
loses money, the manager can expect to lose a hefty portion of their funds under 
management. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence for strong loss aversion in the hedge 
fund asset market. Ever since the quantitative fund meltdown in August 2007, hedge 
fund managers have been forced to make public statements that their funds are stable in 
an effort to keep their investors from withdrawing funds. Hedge fund investors’ fears of 
further losses have been especially strong throughout 2008. The situation in the hedge 
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fund asset market is best captured by a recent article in the New York Times entitled 
“Hedge funds are bracing for investors to cash out” (Story (2008)). The article’s main 
thesis is that investors are looking to withdraw their money from poor performing hedge 
funds because they fear further losses. 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between past performance and fund 
flows supports the notion that investors are loss averse. Research by Ippoliot (1992) and 
Warther (1995) show mutual fund managers lose funds under management when they 
perform poorly. The characterization of the loss aversion is documented by Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Pele (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998) who 
document a convex performance-flow relation.  
Loss aversion is stronger in other sectors of the asset management industry. For 
private equity, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find a concave relationship between fund 
flows and performance. In hedge funds the strength of loss aversion is debated, but 
evidence indicates that poor performance leads to large withdrawals (Baquero and 
Verbeek (2007) document a linear flow-performance relationship and Ding et al. (2008) 
find a concave flow-performance relation).   
Specific findings from the literature support the notion that particular hedge fund 
investors are loss averse: long/short, emerging, and small funds (Baquero and Verbeek 
(2007)), and funds with various investor restrictions (subscription periods, 
onshore/offshore, capacity constrained styles, total redemption period, asset illiquidity, 
and lock-up provisions, advance notice periods, and redemption periods) (Ding et al. 
(2008)) are more sensitive to poor performance than the universe of hedge funds. 
Finally, Baquero, Horst, and Verbeek (2004) find that liquidation probabilities of hedge 
funds are heavily dependent on past performance. 
 
B. The Performance Based Arbitrage Model with Loss Aversion 
If arbitrage fund investors are loss averse, their G function will act differently when 
the arbitrager’s gross return (z) is negative.  We model this by saying G(z) takes the 
functional form of H(z), which is represented by 
ܪሺݖሻ ൌ ൜
ܽݖ ൅ 1 െ ܽ, ݂݋ݎ ݖ ൒ 1, ݓ݅ݐ݄ ܽ ൒ 1
ܾݖ ൅ 1 െ ܾ, ݂݋ݎ ݖ ൏ 1, ݓ݅ݐ݄ ܾ ൐ ܽ . 
(8)
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Equation (7) now becomes: 
ܨଶ ൌ
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓܽ ቄሺܦଵሻ ቀ
௉మ
௉భ
ቁ ൅ ሺܨଵ െ ܦଵሻቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ, for ቆሺܦଵሻ ቀ
௉మ
௉భ
ቁ ൅ ሺܨଵ െ ܦଵሻቇ ൒ Fଵ 
ܾ ቄሺܦଵሻ ቀ
௉మ
௉భ
ቁ ൅ ሺܨଵ െ ܦଵሻቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ, for ቆሺܦଵሻ ቀ
௉మ
௉భ
ቁ ൅ ሺܨଵ െ ܦଵሻቇ  ൏ ܨଵ
. (9)
Arbitragers maximize their wealth at t=2. Because arbitragers operate in a 
competitive market for investment services and marginal cost is constant, maximizing 
wealth at t=2 is equivalent to maximizing funds under management at t=2 (Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997)), or 
max
஽భ
ܧሺܨଶሻ ൌ ߮ ൤ܽ ൜ሺܦଵሻ ൬
ܸ
ଵܲ
൰ ൅ ሺܨଵ െ ܦଵሻൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨ ൅ 
ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ܾ ൜ሺܦଵሻ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ ൅ ሺܨଵ െ ܦଵሻൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ൨ 
 
(10)
This equation is subject to the constraint that ܧሺܨଶሻ ൒ ܨଵ, since the arbitrager can 
always hold ܨଵ in cash and hold it until period 2, thus guaranteeing they will have ܨଵ 
funds under management at t=2. We also constrain the problem so that arbitrage is 
risky in the bad state of the world and there are no pure arbitrage opportunities. (See 
appendix for the first order condition). 
 Figure 1 gives perspective on the reasonableness of various a’s and b’s that 
correspond to arbitrage fund investor’s sensitivities to past performance. In this figure 
we calculate the funds withdrawn from or deposited to an arbitrager in three different 
cases: the arbitrager has investors defined by G(z) and experiences a loss, the arbitrager 
has loss averse investors defined by H(z) and experiences a loss, and the arbitrager 
experiences a gain (investors defined by G(z) and H(z) will deposit the same amount if 
the arbitrager does well).  
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Figure 1: Fund flow and investor sensitivity to past performance. This figure plots the sensitivity 
arbitrage investors have to past performance (x) against investor fund flows. Initial parameters are set as 
V ൌ 1, Fଵ ൌ .1, Sଵ ൌ .3, Sଶ ൌ .4, and φ ൌ .7. We also assume a simple loss aversion of b=3a. Fund flows at 
t=2 are measured as FundFlowଶ ൌ Fଵ ቀ1 െ
Pమ
Pభ
ቁ ሺ1 െ ݔሻ where x is equal to b when the arbitrager has poor 
performance and loss averse investors, and equal to a otherwise (see appendix). 
 
Using this set up, if arbitrage fund investors choose ܽ ൌ 1 the arbitrager will 
have no funds deposited if they show positive performance and have no funds 
withdrawn if they show negative performance; however, with loss averse investors poor 
performance will lead the arbitrage investors to pull .0190 from the fund, leaving the 
fund manager with .0715 assets under management as opposed to .0905 in the case with 
no loss aversion. We take no stance on the empirically observed values of a and b, but 
believe it is reasonable to think that real-world loss averse arbitrage fund investors set 
ܽ ൐ 1 and ܾ ൐ ܽ.    
 
PROPOSITION 1: ܨ݋ݎ ܽ ݃݅ݒ݁݊ ܸ,   ଵܵ, ܵ,  ܨଵ, ߮, ܽ݊݀ ܽ, ݐ݄݁ݎ݁ ݅ݏ ܽ ܾכ ݏݑ݄ܿ ݐ݄ܽݐ, ݂݋ݎ ܾ ൐
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ܾכ,  ܦଵ ൏ Fଵ, ܽ݊݀ ݂݋ݎ ܾ ൏ ܾכ, Dଵ ൌ Fଵ.  
 
A risk neutral arbitrager will invest in their respective arbitrage opportunity if 
ܧሺܨଶሻ ൒ ܨଵ. If arbitrage investors are loss averse, i.e. b is higher than a, it is plausible 
that the arbitrager will not invest all his capital in a risk arbitrage opportunity for fear 
that if the trade loses, his loss averse investors will take so many funds from his firm 
that he loses money in expectation. It is also possible that if arbitrage investors are not 
very loss averse, i.e. b is not much higher than a, that the arbitrager will invest all of 
his funds in his risk arbitrage opportunity. More formally, if the first order condition 
holds with equality, the equilibrium is given by equations (4), (9), and (A1). If the first 
order condition holds with inequality, equilibrium is given by Dଵ ൌ Fଵ and ଵܲ ൌ ܸ െ ଵܵ ൅
ܨଵ. We illustrate that both equilibria are possible with a numerical example. Let 
ܸ ൌ 1, ܨଵ ൌ .1, ܽ ൌ 1.2,   ଵܵ ൌ .3,  ܵଶ ൌ .4, and φ ൌ .7. For this example, ܾכ ൌ 2.89. If 
ܾ ൏ 2.89, ܦଵ ൌ ܨଵ ൌ .1 and arbitragers put all of their capital into their arbitrage 
opportunity. The first period price (determined by equation 4) is .68. On the other 
hand, if ܾ ൐ ܾכ, say ܾ ൌ 3.6, then ܦଵ ൌ .0904 and ଵܲ ൌ .6704. 
Proposition 1 shows that the level of loss aversion determines how arbitragers 
invest. It also shows that if an arbitrager’s investors are loss averse, arbitrage may be 
limited, as arbitragers find it will not be worth participating in an arbitrage opportunity 
if a loss in their fund would cause their investors to go fleeing for the exits. Because 
arbitrage is limited, market prices will not be efficient. For example, in the illustration 
above, when ܾ ൏ ܾכ, ଵܲ ൌ .68, but when ܾ ൌ 3.6 ൐ ܾכ,  ଵܲ ൌ .6704. In neither situation is 
the fundamental market price ( ଵܲ ൌ ܧሺ ଶܲሻ ൌ .5 כ ሺ1ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ .5ሻ כ ሺ1 െ .4ሻ ൌ .8) realized; 
however, loss aversion exacerbates the key finding from SV 1997, that in a performance 
based world, arbitrage is limited and asset prices can drift from fundamental value. 
Another question to address is how loss aversion affects arbitragers’ wealth. One 
may hypothesize that the presence of loss averse investors will negatively affect 
arbitrager wealth. All else equal, having investors who are more prone to withdraw 
funds when performance is poor should lower expected arbitrager profits. Proposition 2 
shows this to be the case. 
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PROPOSITION 2: When arbitrage fund investors are loss averse and arbitrager returns 
are risky ሺ௏ିௌమ
௉భ
൏ 1ሻ, invested arbitragers experience lower expected wealth, 
ܧ௟௢௦௦ ௔ௗ௩௘௥௦௘ሺܨଶሻ ൏ ܧሺܨଶሻ. 
 
 The intuition for this proposition is straight forward: if there is a state of the 
world where an arbitrager can have a losing trade, he will lose relatively more funds in a 
world filled with loss averse investors (who run for the exits when the fund posts a 
negative return), then he will in the world where investors are not loss averse. 
The implication from proposition 2 is that arbitrage funds that operate in 
segments with heavy noise trader influence will cater to investors who are less prone to 
withdrawing large amounts of money in the case of a loss, and/or they will form 
contracts with their investors that prevent them from withdrawing their funds in the 
short-term. Examples of this in the real world hedge fund industry include lock-ups and 
fund distribution limits, commonly referred to as “gates.” We should also see that 
arbitragers charge higher fees when they operate in noise trader filled markets and/or 
have investors who are more willing to withdraw funds after poor performance. 
 
III. Information Exchange in a Loss Averse PBA Setting 
As is shown by propositions 1 and 2, arbitragers face difficulty in the presence of 
loss averse investors and noise trader shocks. We next analyze how information 
exchange amongst arbitragers can mitigate some of this difficulty. 
We analyze two arbitragers operating in different segments (segments could be as 
broad as merger arbitrage versus statistical arbitrage or more narrowly focused, for 
example, fundamental value investors analyzing companies in different industries). 
Arbitrager A follows asset x and arbitrager B follows asset y.  
Arbitragers A and B are not familiar with each other’s asset because they have 
niche skill sets, a fixed amount of time, and limited research resources. To avert these 
issues, arbitrager A and arbitrager B decide to form a network. They agree that when A 
has a good idea he will exchange it for a good idea from B and vice versa. Because 
arbitrager A and B are highly sophisticated investors, they are able to understand the 
structure of the model determining asset prices in their respective strategies and can 
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verify that their counterparty has an ability to identify arbitrage opportunities.  
The arbitragers believe that by sharing their non-perfectly correlated arbitrage 
opportunities with each other they can lower the variance of their returns and appease 
their investors, who are not sophisticated enough to understand their investment 
strategies and thus use past returns as a simple heuristic on which to assess the 
arbitragers (Shleifer and Vishny(1997); Ippolito, (1992); and Warther (1995)).  
Arbitragers also understand that loss averse investors may force them to pass on 
their own arbitrage opportunities (as shown in proposition 1 above) because the risk 
that the trade goes bust will cause them to lose a large portion of their assets under 
management. However, if they share ideas and thus diversify their position risk, they 
may find it profitable to invest in an arbitrage opportunity they would have had to pass 
up if they did not exchange ideas with another arbitrager. Before we can address these 
issues we need a baseline case from which to work. The starting point for our analysis of 
whether or not sharing makes sense is captured in proposition 3. 
 
PROPOSITION 3: In a marketplace with no loss averse investors, arbitragers are 
indifferent between sharing ideas and working alone. 
  
 This is a simple notion to understand. The main benefit of sharing ideas is that 
arbitragers would get diversification, which smoothens returns in bad states of the 
world; however, if arbitrage fund investors react mildly to losses (sensitivity to 
performance is equal during good and bad performance), there is no benefit to sharing 
ideas.  
 
A. The Information Exchange Model 
At t=1 arbitragers A and B decide to split their respective funds and put ܦଵ to 
their own idea and allocate ଵܰ into the other’s idea. In this case, the arbitragers demand 
for a particular asset will be ܳܣଵ ൌ
஽భ
௉భ
൅ ேభ
௉భ
. Aggregate demand must equal the unit 
supply of an asset (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), thus the price of an asset at t=2 is 
ଵܲ ൌ ܧሺ ଶܲሻ െ ଵܵ ൅ ܦଵ ൅ ଵܰ. (11) 
We assume ܦଵ ൅ ଵܰ ൏ ଵܵ, so arbitragers do not have enough resources to bring the 
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period 1 price to fundamental value (i.e. borrowing constraints). 
At t=1, assets x and y suffer noise trader shocks of the same size, ܵ௫,ଵ ൌ ܵ௬,ଵ. 
These shocks drive the prices of x and y below fundamental value (ܧሺ ଶܲሻ െ ଵܵ ൌ ଵܲ ൏
ܧሺ ଶܲ)), thus creating similar arbitrage opportunities for A and B. 
At t=1, arbitragers A and B each have ܨଵ to invest and wish to maximize their 
wealth at t=2. The arbitragers have the option to share their ideas with one another, 
invest all their money in their respective ideas, or hold a portion of their portfolio in 
cash (ܥଵ). If sharing ideas is a profitable decision for arbitragers A and B ( ܧ௦௛௔௥௘ሺܨଶሻ ൐
ܧ௔௟௢௡௘ሺܨଶሻ), they will choose to invest ଵܰ in the other’s arbitrage opportunity, put ܦଵ in 
their own arbitrage opportunity, and place ܨଵ െ ଵܰ െ ܦଵ in cash. However, because 
arbitragers A and B have similar arbitrage opportunities, we assume that the 
arbitragers agree to a simple allocation rule and set ܦଵ ൌ ଵܰ, or in other words, they 
divide their money evenly between their own idea and the other’s idea. For 
concreteness, we also assume arbitragers will be fully invested at t=1 when arbitrage 
opportunities are present (this will occur when ܾ ൏ ܾכ as is shown in proposition 1). 
At t=2, assets x and y have a ߮ probability that noise trader mispricing worsens, 
or, ܵ௫,ଶ, ܵ௬,ଶ ൌ ܵ ൐ ଵܵ. There is a complementary probability of 1 െ ߮ that ܵ௫,ଶ, ܵ௬,ଶ ൌ 0, 
and assets x and y reach their fundamental values of V at t=2. It is assumed that noise 
trader influences in assets x and y are independent of one another, i.e. ߩ൫ܵ௫,ଶ, ܵ௬,ଶ൯ ൌ 0 
(this is a simplifying assumption and our conclusions only rely on the notion that noise 
traders in assets x and y trading influences are not perfectly correlated).  At the end of 
this period arbitragers cash out of their positions and provide performance results to 
their investors. 
In this world  
ܧ௦௛௔௥௘ሺܨ௜,ଶሻ ൌ ߮߮ ቂܽ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵቃ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ߮ ቂݔ ቄቀ
ிభ௏ି஽భௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅
ሺ1 െ ݔሻܨଵቃ ൅ ߮ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ቂݔ ቄቀ
ிభ௏ିேభௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݔሻܨଵቃ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ቂܾ ቄܨଵ ቀ
௏ିௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅
ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵቃ ݏ. ݐ. ܦଵ ൌ ଵܰ, 
(12) 
where, 
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ݔ ൌ
ە
۔
ۓܽ, ݂݅ 
ሺ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ܽݐ ݐ ൌ 2ሻ
ଵܲ
൒ 1
ܾ, ݂݅ 
ሺ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ܽݐ ݐ ൌ 2ሻ
ଵܲ
൏ 1
.  
 
PROPOSITION 4: When arbitragers act alone, for a given  ܸ, ଵܵ, ܵ,  ܨଵ, ߮, and a, there is 
a ܾכ such that, for ܾ ൐ ܾכ, ܦଵ ൏ ܨଵ, ܽ݊݀ ݂݋ݎ ܾ ൏ ܾכ, ܦଵ ൌ ܨଵ; however, when arbitragers 
share ideas there is a ܾᇱ ൐ ܾכ such that ܦଵ ൅ ଵܰ ൌ ܨଵ.  
 
This proposition is best illustrated by a numerical example. Let ܸ ൌ 1, ܨଵ ൌ
.1, ܽ ൌ 1.2, ଵܵ ൌ .3, ܵଶ ൌ .4, and φ ൌ .7. For this example, ܾכ ൌ 2.89. If ܾ ൏ 2.89, ܦଵ ൌ
ܨଵ ൌ .1 and arbitragers put all of their capital into their arbitrage opportunity. The first 
period price (determined by equation 4) is .68. On the other hand, if ܾ ൐ ܾכ, say ܾ ൌ
3.6, then ܦଵ ൌ .0904 and ଵܲ ൌ .6704, thus implying that arbitrage hold back some of 
their capital. In contrast, when arbitragers share ideas their willingness to invest in 
arbitrage opportunities increases. For example, if ܾᇱ ൐ ܾכ, say b=3.6, then ଵܰ ൅ ܦଵ ൌ
ܨଵ ൌ .1 and ଵܲ ൌ .68.  
The key insight from this proposition is that sharing can encourage profit 
maximizing arbitragers to invest more funds into arbitrage opportunities than they 
would if they were not exchanging ideas. Sharing also pushes asset prices closer to 
fundamental value. The next proposition further explores under what circumstances 
arbitragers will share ideas. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: Capital constrained arbitragers (ܨଵ ൏ ଵܵ ൅ ܵଶሺ1 െ ߮ሻ) operating in a 
marketplace with loss averse investors will always shares ideas. 
 
Noise traders affect the decision for arbitragers to share ideas in a couple of ways: 
they can either drive prices lower with high shocks ( ଵܵ and/or ܵଶ are large), or they can 
have a low probability of assessing the t=2 market price correctly (߮ is low). 
Arbitragers can counterbalance these influences if they have a large amount of resources 
relative to the noise trader mispricing (ܨଵ is large).  
In a real world setting, proposition 5 suggests that empirically we should see 
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arbitragers sharing ideas in markets that are more prone to noise trader influences (e.g. 
small stocks versus large stocks) or in markets where they have more capital constraints 
(equity markets versus bond markets). 
 
PROPOSITION 6: Arbitragers who share ideas will have correlated portfolios and crowd 
into trades. 
 
In the simple setup described, sharing arbitragers will hold the same portfolio of 
assets. In this basic case, the portfolios of sharing arbitragers will be perfectly 
correlated. In general, if arbitragers maintain a portfolio of positions and hold only a 
portion of their portfolio in shared assets, arbitrager portfolios will show less correlation, 
but it will still likely be positive. Moreover, we do not rigorously analyze the case of 
multiple arbitragers sharing multiple ideas; however, it is intuitive to understand that if 
arbitragers are sharing ideas amongst each other and investing in many of the same 
assets, trading ideas will become crowded with arbitrage investors all clamoring for the 
same arbitrage (Colla and Mele (2007) and Ozsoylev (2005) develop social network 
models and rigorously show that correlations and the likelihood of crowded trades 
increases when agents share information).  
 
IV. Discussion 
Our simple model of arbitrager behavior in the face of loss averse investors is a 
way to capture the notion that arbitragers may choose to share ideas in certain 
circumstances. This contrasts with the view that all arbitragers are secretive operations 
that operate with black boxes and crystal balls. 
Loss aversion was the primary mechanism behind the desire to share ideas, and the 
circumstance we believed to be most credible after reviewing the literature, speaking 
with hedge fund managers, and following anecdotal evidence in the main stream 
financial press; however, other elements such as arbitrager risk aversion, herd behavior 
(Scharfstein and Stein (1990)), laziness, or internal resource deficiency could also lead to 
similar conclusions. We do not model these other mechanisms, but believe they will lead 
to the same conclusion: under certain circumstances, sharing trading ideas can make 
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sense. 
 
A. Empirical Implications 
Loss averse investors can have real affects on arbitragers and asset prices. As 
proposition 1 shows, if loss aversion is strong enough, arbitragers will scale down their 
investment and market prices will stray from the efficient price. This prediction has 
implications for the real-world. All other things being equal, if certain asset classes 
attract arbitragers who tend to have loss averse investors, we would expect these assets 
to be more mispriced. We see evidence for this in the real world: arbitragers with more 
risk averse investors include long/short, emerging, and smaller hedge funds (Baquero 
and Verbeek (2007)). The hedge fund managers who operate these funds typically invest 
in smaller stocks, which are often cited as being mispriced (e.g. Banz (1981) or Fama 
and French (1992)).  
As proposition 2 suggests, loss averse investors lower the expected profits of 
arbitragers. To counteract this phenomenon we should expect to see higher fees charged 
to certain classes of investors more prone to loss aversion and/or contracts that prevent 
investors from withdrawing funds in the short-term. Empirically, this behavior exists in 
the hedge fund market. Many funds vary their fee structure depending on the type of 
investor, and the contract signed. If investors agree to longer lock-up periods they are 
charged lower fees and shorter lock-ups are charged higher fees. A report by the 
Alternative Investment Advisory Specialist Group says it best, “Managers desire lock-
ups in general because a stable asset base eases pressure for smoother return streams 
(for fear that investors may pull capital because of poor short-term results) and permits 
the deployment of capital over longer time horizons” (AIAS (2005)). 
Propositions 4 and 5 seem to indicate that information exchange between 
arbitragers can be a good idea. If this is true, at the very minimum we should see 
mechanisms that facilitate information exchange for arbitragers in the marketplace. 
Indeed, this is exactly what we see. The more established invite-only venues that allow 
professional hedge fund managers and affiliates to discuss ideas include 
Valueinvestorsclub.com, Sumzero.com, Value Investing Congress, Hedge Fund Activism 
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and Shareholder Value Summit, and the Lehman Finance in Practice Conference. 
Moreover, our interviews with hedge fund managers and hedge fund asset allocation 
consultants suggest, at least anecdotally, that information exchange is prevalent.  
 Other implications from proposition 4 and 5 are that asset markets with loss 
averse investors, such as long/short strategies, emerging hedge funds, or smaller hedge 
funds (Baquero and Verbeek (2007)), should see more sharing amongst managers. We 
should also see more sharing in markets with higher noise trader risk (e.g. small 
capitalization stocks, stub arbitrage (Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford, 2002), and 
pairs/twin arbitrage (Froot and Dabora, 1999)). In fact, Gray and Kern’s analysis of 
roughly 3000 investment ideas submitted to the private internet community 
Valueinvestorsclub.com website from January 2000 to June 2008 corroborates the notion 
that sharing occurs in assets commonly thought to be subject to high levels of noise 
trader risk. Specifically, they find that a vast majority of the ideas submitted to 
Valueinvestorsclub.com are recommendations for micro-capitalization stocks 
(<$500mm), or special situations such as stub and pair arbitrages, liquidations, and 
spin-offs in relatively illiquid markets (Gray and Kern (2008)). 
A final implication of our model, captured in proposition 6, is that arbitrager 
information exchange causes their portfolios to be more correlated. Empirically, we see 
that hedge fund manager returns are correlated and that this correlation is increasing. 
Anecdotal examples include the Long Term Capital Management episode (Lowenstein 
(2000)), the August 2007 quantitative funds meltdown (Khandani and Lo (2007)), and 
the September/October 2008 chaos (Curran and Rogow (2008)). Comprehensive studies 
on the subject have been conducted by Garbaravicius and Dierick (2005) and Khandani 
and Lo (2007).  Garbaravicius and Dierick find that individual hedge funds pairwise 
correlations within categories are increasing, and there is “crowding” on certain trades. 
Khandani and Lo confirm this result and conclude that the “hedge-fund industry has 
clearly become more closely connected.” 
Financial markets have recently highlighted the existence of crowded trades. The 
Porsche/Volkswagen negative stub trade is a case study (a full discussion and analysis 
of negative stub trades are described in Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002)). The 
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idea was posted in September 2008 to Valueinvestorsclub.com. The recommended trade 
was very well received by the Valueinvestorsclub.com community and was given one of 
the highest rankings in the club’s history. The investment thesis was simple: 
Volkswagen was overvalued and Porsche’s ownership of Volkswagen gave Porsche a 
negative equity value. The trade was to go long Porsche and short Volkswagen.  
In late October, Porsche management made an announcement that it was 
increasing its ownership in Volkswagen. This announcement caused a massive short 
squeeze that sent the stock of Volkswagen soaring over 348% in two days. At one point, 
Porsche became the most highly valued company in the world (Zuckerman, Strasburg, 
and Esterl (2008)). Multiple hedge funds suffered massive losses. Laurie Pinto, a broker 
at North Square Capital said it best, “This [Volkswagen short squeeze] is without 
question the biggest single loss on a single stock in the history of hedge funds. It’s a 
bloodbath.” (Jameson and Robertson (2008)). We will never know if all the hedge fund 
involved in this trade randomly stumbled across the same idea or if this idea was shared 
amongst a group of managers; however, based on the volume of questions and general 
interest on Valueinvestorsclub.com following the posting of the Porsche/Volkswagen 
trade, it seems that many people discovered this trade via information exchange. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
Using the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) model as a base, we examine how loss averse 
arbitrage fund investors affect the marketplace. We find that loss aversion exacerbates 
the limits to arbitrage and decreases arbitrager’s profits. We further examine what 
happens in the marketplace when arbitragers can share ideas with other specialized 
arbitragers who have unique arbitrage opportunities. Our conclusions were as follows: 
sharing leads to more efficient asset prices, larger arbitrager profits, systems that allow 
arbitragers to efficiently share ideas, and correlated arbitrager portfolios. 
Sharing can have unforeseen circumstances for the marketplace. In normal times, 
correlated hedge fund portfolios have never been a big concern, but the recent 
unprecedented market events (starting September 2008) have transformed the hedge 
fund market. Highly levered funds are losing massive amounts of money and their 
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investors are falling over each other to withdraw funds, which has lead to further 
liquidations. Unfortunately, a lot of these positions being liquidated at fire sale prices 
are held by other hedge funds that were sharing ideas or utilizing similar stock picking 
strategies. This transformation in the market has highlighted a risk of sharing and the 
use of leverage in the hedge fund market. Going forward, hedge fund managers will 
likely continue to share ideas in certain sectors, but will operate with a lower level of 
leverage and conduct a deeper due diligence of their sharing counterparties. 
 
Appendix 
 
A. First Order Condition 
 The first order condition is given by 
ௗாሺிమሻ
ௗ஽భ
ൌ
ሾ௔ఝ௏ି௕ሺଵିఝሻሺ௏ିௌమሻሿ
௉భ
െ
ሾ௔ఝ௏஽భି௕ሺଵିఝሻሺ௏ିௌమሻ஽భሿ
௉భ
మ െ ܾሺ1 െ ߮ሻ െ ܽ߮ ൒ 0 ,  
which implies  
ܦଵכ ൒ ଵܵ ൅ ܵଶሺ1 െ ߮ሻ െ ܸ െ ቂ
ሺௌభାௌమሺଵିఝሻି௏ሻሺ௕ሺଵିఝሻሺௌమି௏ሻା௔ఝ௏
௕ሺଵିఝሻି௔ఝ
ቃ
.ହ
. (A1)
 
B. Fund Flow Calculations 
Explanation of fund flow calculation: We know ܨଶ ൌ ܽ ቄሺܦଵሻ ቀ
௉మ
௉భ
ቁ ൅ ሺܨଵ െ ܦଵሻቅ ൅
ሺ1 െ ݔሻܨଵ where x=a for non-loss averse arbitrage investors regardless of performance. 
For loss averse arbitrage investors, x=a when performance is positive, but x=b if 
performance is negative. Funds at t=2 can be written as ܨଶ ൌ ܨଵ ൅ ܦଵ
௉మି௉భ
௉భ
൅
ܦଵ
௉మି௉భ
௉భ
ሺݔ െ 1ሻ. This equation can be decomposed into three parts: initial funds at t=1 
(ܨଵሻ, gains from trading (ܦଵ
௉మି௉భ
௉భ
), and fund flows (ܨݑ݊݀ܨ݈݋ݓଵ ൌ ܦଵ
௉మି௉భ
௉భ
ሺݔ െ 1ሻ). 
 
C. Proofs of Proposition 2,3, and 5 
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Proof of Proposition 2: We want to show that ܧ௟௢௦௦ ௔ௗ௩௘௥௦௘ሺܨଶሻ ൏ ܧሺܨଶሻ. By 
definition 
ܧ௟௢௦௦ ௔ௗ௩௘௥௦௘ሺܨଶሻ െ ܧሺܨଶሻ
ൌ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ܾ ൜ሺܦଵሻ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ ൅ ሺܨଵ െ ܦଵሻൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ൨
െ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ܽ ൜ሺܦଵሻ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ ൅ ሺܨଵ െ ܦଵሻൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
ൌ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ܦଵሺܾ െ ܽሻ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
െ 1൰൨ 
(A2)
We know ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൐ 0, and ܦଵሺܾ െ ܽሻ ൐ 0 by definition. If arbitrage is risky (there is a 
state of the world in t=2 where the arbitrager will lose money), then ቀ௏ିௌమ
௉భ
െ 1ቁ ൏ 0, 
which implies equation A1 is less than 0, or ܧ௟௢௦௦ ௔ௗ௩௘௥௦௘ሺܨଶሻ ൏ ܧሺܨଶሻ. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: The expected profits for an arbitrager working alone is 
given by 
ܧ௔௟௢௡௘ሺܨଶሻ ൌ ߮ ቂܽ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵቃ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ቂܽ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏ିௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵቃ, (A3)
and the expected profits for arbitragers working together are expressed as 
ܧ௦௛௔௥௘ሺܨ௜,ଶሻ ൌ ߮߮ ൤ܽ ൜ሺܨଵሻ ൬
ܸ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ߮ ൤ܽ ൜൬
ܨଵܸ െ ܦଵܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ߮ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ܽ ൜൬
ܨଵܸ െ ଵܰܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ܽ ൜ܨଵ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ൨   
ݏ. ݐ. ܦଵ ൌ ଵܰ. 
 
 
 
(A4)
If We substitute and let ܯ ൌ ܽ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ, ܰ ൌ ܽ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏ିௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ , 
and ܲ ൌ ܽ ቄቀிభ௏ିேభௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ the difference in profits between sharing and working 
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alone becomes 
ܧ௦௛௔௥௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ െ ܧ௔௟௢௡௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ ൌ ߮ଶܯ െ ߮ܯ ൅ 2ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ߮ܲ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻଶܰ െ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻܰ 
ൌ ሺܯ ൅ ܰሻሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ െ 2ܼሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ 
ൌ ሺܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲሻሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ. 
 
(A5)
This implies, ܧ௦௛௔௥௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ െ ܧ௔௟௢௡௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ ൌ ሺܯ ൅ ܰ െ 2ܲሻሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ ൌ 0  iff ሺܯ ൅ ܰ െ
2ܲሻ ൌ 0, because ሺ߮ሻต
ା
ሺ߮ െ 1ሻᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ି
൏ 0. Substituting again,  
ܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲ ൌ ܽ ൜ሺܨଵሻ ൬
ܸ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ ൅ ܽ ൜ሺܨଵሻ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ 
ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ െ 2 ቂܽ ቄቀ
ிభ௏ିேభௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵቃ. 
(A6)
We know ܦଵ ൅ ଵܰ ൌ ܨଵ, as it is assumed ܾ ൏ ܾכ (see proposition 1) and arbitragers will 
be fully invested. Also, because arbitragers split their portfolio evenly between their own 
idea and the shared idea, ܦଵ ൌ ଵܰ, this means ܨଵ ൌ 2ܦଵ, which further implies ܨଵ
௏ିௌమ
௉భ
ൌ
ܨଵ
௏
௉భ
െ 2 ଵܰ ቀ
ௌమ
௉భ
ቁ. Substituting this result into A3 implies ܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲ ൌ 0. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: Capital constrained arbitragers (ܨଵ ൏ ଵܵ ൅ ܵଶሺ1 െ ߮ሻ) 
operating in a marketplace with loss averse investors will always shares ideas. 
 
1. Determining investor sensitivity to gross returns 
We know  
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ܧ௦௛௔௥௘ሺܨ௜,ଶሻ ൌ ߮߮ ൤ݔ ൜ሺܨଵሻ ൬
ܸ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ߮ ൤ݔ ൜൬
ܨଵܸ െ ܦଵܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ߮ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ݔ ൜൬
ܨଵܸ െ ଵܰܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ݔ ൜ܨଵ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ൨   
ݏ. ݐ. ܦଵ ൌ ଵܰ. 
 
 
 
(A7)
where, 
ݔ ൌ
ە
۔
ۓܽ, ݂݅ 
ሺ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ܽݐ ݐ ൌ 2ሻ
ଵܲ
൒ ܨଵ
ܾ, ݂݅ 
ሺ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ܽݐ ݐ ൌ 2ሻ
ଵܲ
൏ ܨଵ
.  
 
We assume that ܸ െ ܵଶ ൏ ଵܲ, or ݔ ൌ ܾ if the portfolio value at t=2 is ܨଵ ቀ
௏ିௌమ
௉భ
ቁ, and We 
assume ܸ ൐ ଵܲ, or ݔ ൌ ܽ if the portfolio value at t=2 is ܨଵ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁ. These assumptions limit 
arbitrage capital such that ܵଶ߮ ൐ ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൐ ܵଶሺ߮ െ 1ሻ. We also know that ݔ ൌ
ܽ ݂݅ ቀிభ௏ି஽భௌమ
௉భ
ቁ ൒ ܨଵ. We know ܦଵ ൅ ଵܰ ൌ ܨଵ as it is assumed ܾ ൏ ܾכ. Also, because 
arbitragers split their portfolio evenly between their own idea and the shared idea, 
ܦଵ ൌ ଵܰ, which implies ܦଵ ൌ .5ܨଵ, which further implies ቀ
ிభ௏ି஽భௌమ
௉భ
ቁ ൌ ቀிభሺ௏ି.ହௌమሻ
௉భ
ቁ. 
Substituting the definition of ଵܲ ൌ ܸ ൅ ܵଶሺ߮ െ 1ሻ െ ଵܵ ൅ ܨଵ into the equation, we have 
ݔ ൌ ܽ ݂݅ ቀ ிభሺ௏ି.ହௌమሻ
௏ାௌమሺఝିଵሻିௌభାிభ
ቁ ൒ ܨଵ. When we simplify this expression we have ݔ ൌ ܽ if 
ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൒ ܵଶሺ߮ െ .5ሻ. and ݔ ൌ ܾ otherwise. 
 
2. Assessing the sharing decision when ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൒ ܵଶሺ߮ െ .5ሻ 
We first compare the strategies of sharing and working alone when ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൒
ܵଶሺ߮ െ .5ሻ. In this situation, working alone profits are  
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ܧ௔௟௢௡௘ሺܨଶሻ ൌ ߮ ቂܽ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵቃ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ቂܾ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏ିௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵቃ, (A8)
and the expected profits for arbitragers working together are expressed as 
ܧ௦௛௔௥௘ሺܨ௜,ଶሻ ൌ ߮߮ ൤ܽ ൜ሺܨଵሻ ൬
ܸ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ߮ ൤ܽ ൜൬
ܨଵܸ െ ܦଵܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ߮ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ܽ ൜൬
ܨଵܸ െ ଵܰܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ܾ ൜ܨଵ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ൨   
ݏ. ݐ. ܦଵ ൌ ଵܰ. 
 
 
 
(A9)
If we substitute and let ܯ ൌ ܽ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ, ܰ ൌ ܾ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏ିௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ , 
and ܲ ൌ ܽ ቄቀிభ௏ିேభௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ the difference in profits between sharing and working 
alone becomes 
ܧ௦௛௔௥௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ െ ܧ௔௟௢௡௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ ൌ ߮ଶܯ െ ߮ܯ ൅ 2ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ߮ܲ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻଶܰ െ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻܰ 
ൌ ሺܯ ൅ ܰሻሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ െ 2ܼሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ 
ൌ ሺܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲሻሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ. 
 
(A10) 
This implies, ܧ௦௛௔௥௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ െ ܧ௔௟௢௡௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ ൌ ሺܯ ൅ ܰ െ 2ܲሻሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ, which is positive if 
and only if ܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲ ൏ 0, because ሺ߮ሻต
ା
ሺ߮ െ 1ሻᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ି
൏ 0 by assumption.  
Substituting again,  
ܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲ ൌ ܽ ൜ሺܨଵሻ ൬
ܸ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ ൅ ܾ ൜ሺܨଵሻ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ 
ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ െ 2 ቂܽ ቄቀ
ிభ௏ିேభௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵቃ. 
(A11) 
Equation (A11) can be simplified as ሺܽ െ ܾሻ ቂܨଵ ൅ 2 ቀ
ேభௌమ
௉భ
ቁ െ ܨଵ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁቃ. We know ሺܽ െ ܾሻᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ି
൏
0 by assumption; therefore, in order for ܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲ ൏ 0, ቂܨଵ ൅ 2 ቀ
ேభௌమ
௉భ
ቁ െ ܨଵ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁቃ ൐ 0.  
We simplify the constraint ܨଵ ൅ 2 ቀ
ேభௌమ
௉భ
ቁ െ ܨଵ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁ ൐ 0 as ܨଵሺܨଵ ൅ ܵଶ߮ െ ଵܵሻ ൐ 0, which 
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can be expressed as ܵଶ߮ ൐ ଵܵ െ ܨଵ. We know this inequality must hold because in the 
beginning of this problem we ensured that arbitrage is risky, ܸ െ ܵଶ ൏ ଵܲ, and 
potentially rewarding, ܸ ൐ ଵܲ. These constraints imply ܵଶ߮ ൐ ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൐ ܵଶሺ߮ െ 1ሻ, which 
proves that ܨଵሺܨଵ ൅ ܵଶ߮ െ ଵܵሻ ൐ 0. With this information we can say that ܧ௦௛௔௥௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ െ
ܧ௔௟௢௡௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ ൐ 0 when ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൒ ܵଶሺ߮ െ .5ሻ. 
 
3. Assessing the sharing decision when ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൏ ܵଶሺ߮ െ .5ሻ 
We next compare the strategies of sharing and working alone when ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൏
ܵଶሺ߮ െ .5ሻ, but greater than ܵଶሺ߮ െ 1ሻ to ensure ܸ െ ܵଶ ൏ ଵܲ. In this situation working 
alone profits are if the portfolio value at t ൌ 2 is 
ܧ௔௟௢௡௘ሺܨଶሻ ൌ ߮ ቂܽ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵቃ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ቂܾ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏ିௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵቃ, (A12) 
and the expected profits for arbitragers working together are expressed as 
ܧ௦௛௔௥௘ሺܨ௜,ଶሻ ൌ ߮߮ ൤ܽ ൜ሺܨଵሻ ൬
ܸ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ߮ ൤ܾ ൜൬
ܨଵܸ െ ܦଵܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ߮ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ܾ ൜൬
ܨଵܸ െ ଵܰܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ൨
൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻሺ1 െ ߮ሻ ൤ܾ ൜ܨଵ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ൨   
ݏ. ݐ. ܦଵ ൌ ଵܰ. 
 
 
 
 
(A13) 
If we substitute and let ܯ ൌ ܽ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ, ܰ ൌ ܾ ቄሺܨଵሻ ቀ
௏ିௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ , 
and ܲ ൌ ܾ ቄቀிభ௏ିேభௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ the difference in profits between sharing and working 
alone becomes 
ܧ௦௛௔௥௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ െ ܧ௔௟௢௡௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ ൌ ߮ଶܯ െ ߮ܯ ൅ 2ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ߮ܲ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻଶܰ െ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻܰ 
ൌ ሺܯ ൅ ܰሻሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ െ 2ܼሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ 
ൌ ሺܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲሻሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ. 
 
(A14) 
This implies, ܧ௦௛௔௥௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ െ ܧ௔௟௢௡௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ ൌ ሺܯ ൅ ܰ െ 2ܲሻሺ߮ሻሺ߮ െ 1ሻ, which is positive if 
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and only if ܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲ ൏ 0, because ሺ߮ሻต
ା
ሺ߮ െ 1ሻᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ି
൏ 0 by assumption.  
Substituting again,  
ܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲ ൌ ܽ ൜ሺܨଵሻ ൬
ܸ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܽሻܨଵ ൅ ܾ ൜ሺܨଵሻ ൬
ܸ െ ܵଶ
ଵܲ
൰ൠ ൅ 
ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵ െ 2 ቂܾ ቄቀ
ிభ௏ିேభௌమ
௉భ
ቁቅ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܨଵቃ. 
(A15) 
Equation (A15) can be simplified as ሺܽ െ ܾሻ ቂܨଵ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁ െ ܨଵቃ. We know ሺܽ െ ܾሻᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ି
൏ 0 by 
assumption, therefore, in order for ܯ ൅ܰ െ 2ܲ ൏ 0, ቂܨଵ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁ െ ܨଵቃ ൐ 0.  We simplify the 
constraint ܨଵ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁ െ ܨଵ ൐ 0 as ܨଵ ቀ
௏
௉భ
െ 1ቁ ൐ 0, which can be expressed as ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൐
ܵଶሺ߮ െ 1ሻ. We know this inequality must hold because in the beginning of this problem 
we ensured that arbitrage is risky, ܸ െ ܵଶ ൏ ଵܲ, and potentially rewarding, ܸ ൐ ଵܲ. These 
constraints imply ܵଶ߮ ൐ ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൐ ܵଶሺ߮ െ 1ሻ, which proves that ܨଵ ቀ
௏
௉భ
ቁ െ ܨଵ ൐ 0. With 
this information we can say that ܧ௦௛௔௥௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ െ ܧ௔௟௢௡௘൫ܨ௜,ଶ൯ ൐ 0 when ܵଶሺ߮ െ 1ሻ ൏ ଵܵ െ
ܨଵ ൏ ܵଶሺ߮ െ .5ሻ.  
 
4. Putting it all together 
 We have shown that sharing makes sense when ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൒ ܵଶሺ߮ െ .5ሻ and when 
ܵଶሺ߮ െ 1ሻ ൏ ଵܵ െ ܨଵ ൏ ܵଶሺ߮ െ .5ሻ. Combining these findings we come to the conclusion 
that sharing dominates the working alone strategy when ܵଶሺ߮ െ 1ሻ ൏ ଵܵ െ ܨଵ. When 
ܵଶሺ߮ െ 1ሻ ൒ ଵܵ െ ܨଵ We violate the assumption that ܸ ൒ ଵܲ, which would make 
arbitrage unprofitable. It can therefore be concluded that arbitragers will always share 
ideas when their capital is constrained to ܨଵ ൏ ଵܵ ൅ ܵଶሺ1 െ ߮ሻ. Q.E.D. 
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